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Abstract  
 
Incentive plans involve payments for performance relative to some set of goals. In this paper, we 
extend Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to the evaluation of performance in the specific context of pay-for-
performance incentive plans. The approach proposed ensures that the evaluation of performance of decision 
making units (DMUs) that follow the implementation of incentive plans, is made in terms of targets that are 
attainable, as well as representing best practices. A model is developed that adjusts the benchmarking to the 
goals through the corresponding payment of incentives, thus DEA targets are established taking into 
consideration the improvement strategies that were set out in the incentive plans. To illustrate, we examine an 
application concerned with the financing of public Spanish universities. 
 
Keywords: Benchmarking, Target setting, Incentive plans, Goals, Data Envelopment Analysis. 
1. Introduction 
This paper extends DEA to incorporate management goals in the evaluation of the 
performance of DMUs. Specifically, the approach proposed is developed within the context of pay-
for-performance incentive plans, so that the ultimate aim is to provide a benchmarking framework 
based on appropriate targets for the monitoring of improvements. 
In planning improvements, organizations often implement incentive plans, which typically 
pay for performance relative to some goals (some studies have shown that performance improves as 
a result of the implementation of these plans; see, e.g., Banker et al. (1996, 2000)). Once the goals 
have been set, the payment of incentives is carried out in a subsequent period of performance, as a 
result of an evaluation of the level of achievement of goals. Payment can, for example, be tied to 
performance by means of a linear function connecting incentive rates and the degree of achievement 
of goals. The financing of public Spanish universities can be seen as an example of a situation wherein 
some organizations follow the implementation of pay-for-performance incentive plans. This is due to 
the fact that part of their financing is linked to the achievement of goals relating to the different areas 
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of performance (teaching, research, knowledge transfer,…). Incentive plans of these higher education 
institutions are designed through programme-contracts, which formalize an agreement between 
regional governments and university managers, in which goal levels are set for a number of index 
indicators. The payment incentive is made in the next budgetary year on the basis of an evaluation of 
performance relative to the goals. 
Implementing pay-for-performance incentive plans involves (1) a first step of planning, in 
which goals are set, and (2) a subsequent step of monitoring and control, in which performance is 
evaluated and the payment of incentives is established. This paper focuses exclusively on the latter 
step involving the evaluation of performance, without regard to the way goals were laid out. 
Obviously, such evaluation is, however, determined by the goal levels previously set. In this respect, 
it should be highlighted that, on one hand, goals might have been set without having any evidence 
that they will be achievable at the moment of conducting performance evaluation, and on the other, 
that in participative goal setting, managers whose own performance is to be evaluated have the 
opportunity to influence the goals (downward) in order to maximize the payout (see Anderson et al. 
(2010) for discussions). Taking into account these considerations, we develop an approach for 
evaluating performance in the context of monitoring incentive plans, by using targets that are 
attainable, and as well represent best practices. Furthermore, we seek targets that respect, as much as 
possible, the payment of incentives relative to the goals. 
In order to accomplish the above, we propose the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Charnes et al., 1978), which is a tool directed to evaluating past performances as part of the control 
function of management (as stated in Cooper (2005)). DEA evaluates performance of decision 
making units (DMUs) from a perspective of benchmarking, through the setting of targets on a best-
practice frontier, thereby making it possible to evaluate them against their peers1. See also 
Thanassoulis et al. (2008) and Cook et al. (2014) for discussions on the issue of benchmarking in 
DEA. In the specific situation of having a set of DMUs that follow the implementation of incentive 
plans, DEA can provide an alternative evaluation of performances in time period t, based on targets 
that, in addition to being attainable and efficient, have been established taking into account the goals 
which were set in period t-1. Specifically, the model we develop here finds DEA targets by 
minimizing the differences between the payments of incentives relative to DEA targets and those 
relative to the goals. Relating DEA targets and goals seeks to consider the policy of improvements 
that was pursued through the setting of goals (note that DMUs might have oriented their activities 
                                                 
1 In this sense, DEA is a tool that can be used not only in management control but also it provides certain degrees of 
support to management planning, insofar as it can provide suggestions as to where and by how much an inefficient DMU 
should be improved in order to achieve full efficiency in comparison to its peers (as discussed in Yang et al. (2009)). 
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towards the achievement of the goals, in particular because they have a monetary incentive). Thus, 
as in a conventional DEA benchmarking analysis, we eventually set targets, and the comparisons 
between them and actual data allow us to evaluate performances (which includes analyzing individual 
strengths and weaknesses and establishing directions for improvement) as part of the monitoring 
process of the pay-for-performance incentive plans. See Stewart (2010) which also proposes an 
approach for setting targets within a general framework that incorporates long term goals to the DEA 
models. As with our approach, that author looks for realistically achievable targets, which are on the 
efficient frontier, and are found taking into account the goals. Nevertheless, his approach is aimed at 
planning, while ours is intended mainly for monitoring and control. 
The approach proposed herein is developed in the context of performance evaluation of DMUs 
in terms of a number of index indicators. Index indicators are frequently used in the assessment of 
health services, university performance, wealth or human development in hospitals, higher education 
institutions, and countries. Following Liu et al. (2011), the models for the benchmarking in pay-for-
performance incentive plans we formulate are DEA-type models without inputs, which can be used 
in the evaluation of performance without regard to any production process. It is also highlighted that 
the models are developed within a general framework that would allow us to deal with the specific 
situation of having DMUs organized into groups of units that experience similar circumstances 
(similar objectives, policies,…). In those cases, we do not allow for individual circumstances within 
the set of DMUs of a given group, in line with the within-group common benchmarking approach in 
Cook et al. (2017). This paper is partly motivated by the situation already mentioned of the financing 
of public universities in Spain, wherein many of the competences regarding university policies are 
transferred to the regional governments. As an illustration of the approach proposed, we examine an 
example on university performance in which those institutions in the same region are treated 
uniformly in the sense that targets result from their benchmarking against a common reference set of 
universities. 
The paper unfolds as follows: in section 2 we explain how the payment of incentives is tied 
to performance in our approach. In section 3 we formulate the benchmarking model that provides the 
targets to be used for the evaluation of performance in the context of incentive plans. In particular, 
the developments that lead to a linear problem that allows us to find the optimal solution of the 
benchmarking model, are included in a subsection. Section 4 presents an empirical illustration of the 
proposed approach. Conclusions follow in section 5. 
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2. The payment of incentives 
Throughout the paper, we consider that we have n comparable DMUs that follow the 
implementation of pay-for-performance incentive plans. We suppose that the performance of these 
DMUs is evaluated in terms of s index indicators y1,…,ys. The DMUs can thus be described by means 
of the output vectors jY ,  where  j 1j sjY y ,..., y 0,   jY 0,  j 1,...,n,  record the values of these 
indicators for DMUj, j=1,…,n, corresponding to the performances in time period t, that is, the period 
in which incentives will be paid. It is assumed that larger values of these indicators represent better 
performances. Payment of incentives is usually tied to the degree of achievement of certain goals 
relative to the indicators. Denote by 1j sjˆ ˆy ,..., y ,  any goals for DMUj corresponding to y1,…,ys, 
respectively, which were set in period t-1. 
It can be said that DMUj has achieved the goal set for indicator yr if rj rjyˆ y .  Otherwise, the 
goal would not have been reached. Nevertheless, with incentive plans, it is usually contemplated that 
there is the possibility of paying a certain amount of money in case of rj rjyˆ y ,  provided that rjy  is 
not too different from rjyˆ .  In order to address this situation, we allow for deviations rj rj rjˆs y y ,   
r=1,…,s, j=1,…,n, and set a limit, 
M
rjd , for each such deviation, in the sense that no incentives will be 
paid for values of rjs  larger than or equal to 
M
rjd .  Formally, we can define a function rja , representing 
the degree of achievement of DMUj in goal rjyˆ , in terms of the deviations, in the following manner: 
 rj rja s 1,  if rjs 0,   rj rja s 0,  if 
M
rj rjs d ,  and rja  is defined as a decreasing monotonic function 
of rjs  for values of the deviations in between 0 and 
M
rjd .  Here, the degree of achievement of goals is 
defined as a linear function of the deviations by setting 
M
rj rjd y .  That is, 
 
rj
rj
rj rj rj rj
rj
rj rj
1, s 0
s
a (s ) 1 , 0 s y ,
y
0, s y
 


   

 
 r=1,…,s, j=1,…,n   (1) 
 
Thus, it is considered that the goal is not achieved if the room for improvement in the 
corresponding indicator is more than 100% (a different limit can be set if appropriate). In case of 
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rj rj0 s y ,   for example if rj rjs y 0.2,  the room for improvement of DMUj in yr is of 20% and, 
therefore, we can say that its degree of achievement in that indicator is 80%, that is,  rj rja s 0.8.   
As for the payment itself, typically incentive rates vary linearly with the degree of 
achievement of goals, with a floor of zero (for cases of very poor performance; in this paper, when 
rj rjs y )  and a ceiling which can be the initially available amount of incentives (in the case of Spanish 
universities that amount is in some regions 10% of base financing). Formally, the payment of 
incentives corresponding to yr can be established through a function of the degree of achievement 
 a 0,1  defined as  rj j rf a Q a,   where jQ  are the initially available incentives for DMUj and 
r , r0 1,    j=1,…,n, 
s
r
r 1
1,

   are weights which represent the relative importance that is 
attached to each of the indicators. 
Therefore, in terms of the deviations, the payment of incentives for DMUj corresponding to 
yr can be defined as     rj rj rj rj rjp s f a s ,  that is 
 
j r rj
rj
rj rj j r rj rj
rj
rj rj
Q , s 0
s
p (s ) Q 1 , 0 s y ,
y
0, s y
  

 
       
  
 
 r=1,…,s, j=1,…,n  (2) 
 
Graphically,  
 
  
Figure 1. Payment of incentives 
j rQ 
0 rjs
rj rjp (s )
rjy
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Eventually, the total payment of incentives for DMUj is given by    
s
j j rj rj
r 1
P S p s ,

  where 
 j 1j sjS s ,...,s ,  j=1,…,n. 
 
Remark 1. Other forms of payment that contemplate, for example, payments for overachievement of 
goals and penalties could be considered, by defining  rj rjp s  appropriately through the specification 
of new values for the limits “0” and Mrjd , and/or through the addition of more ranges for rjs  associated 
with the new scenarios of payment. In all cases, we should take into account that payments cannot 
exceed the amount of incentives that is initially available. 
3. Goal-adjusted benchmarking in pay-for-performance incentive plans using 
DEA 
The monitoring of improvements of a given DMUj in the context of the implementation of an 
incentive plan, involves the evaluation of its performance in time period t relative to the goals set in 
period t-1, 
g g
1j sj
ˆ ˆy ,..., y . As a result, the payments are made. It is emphasized in this paper that such 
evaluation of performance should be made in terms of targets that are attainable and represent best 
practices. In addition, there is a need to relate targets and goals, in order to consider the policy of 
improvements that was pursued through the setting of goals. For these reasons, the approach 
developed here proposes adjusting the benchmarking to the goals so that targets lie on the best-
practice frontier of the DEA technology associated with the actual performances of period t, while at 
the same time respecting as much as possible the payments of incentives relative to the goals (note 
that DMUs might argue that they have oriented their activities towards the achievement of the goals). 
In order to do so, we seek to formulate a benchmarking model that allows us to find the DEA targets, 
DEA DEA
1j sj
ˆ ˆy ,..., y ,  which result from minimizing, for each indicator, the differences between the 
incentive payments relative to DEA targets,  DEArj rjp s , where 
DEA DEA
rj rj rj
ˆs y y  , and the payments 
relative to the goals,  grj rjp s , where 
g g
rj rj rj
ˆs y y  . 
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3.1. Model formulation 
For the development to follow, the DMUs are assumed to be organized into G groups, J1,…,JG, 
where units within each group experience similar circumstances. This means that the DMUs are 
assumed to be homogeneous (that is, comparable in terms of the indicators selected for the analysis), 
while those within the groups share objectives, policies, etc., which may differ across groups. In 
particular, managers may establish those common objectives and policies through setting similar 
goals for the DMUs within the groups. In such a situation, it may be considered appropriate to set 
targets treating those DMUs uniformly in terms of benchmark selection (that is, not allowing for 
individual circumstances). The approach proposed here provides a within-group common 
benchmarking framework for performance evaluation through which the DMUs within the groups 
are benchmarked against the same reference set, thus being treated uniformly in the identification of 
best practices and the setting of targets. This can be seen as a general approach, because the method 
developed is based on the DEA frontier determined by the entire set of DMUs. If the DMUs are not 
classified into groups, and we wish to allow for individual circumstances, then it can be assumed that 
we have as many groups as DMUs, J1,…, Jn, where Jj={DMUj}, j=1,…,n (as in the standard DEA). 
If, on the contrary, the DMUs experience similar circumstances, and we want to treat all of them 
uniformly in the analysis, then we can suppose that we have one group only which consists of all the 
DMUs, J={DMU1,…,DMUn}. 
Since we deal with DMUs that are evaluated in terms of several index indicators, we consider 
for the purpose of benchmarking, the following “attainable set” proposed in Liu et al. (2011) 
n n
j j j j
j 1 j 1
AS Y 0 Y Y , 1, 0
 
 
        
 
  , which is a bounded closed convex set. Liu et al. 
(2011) develop a theoretical framework for so-called DEA models without explicit inputs (WEI), 
which can be used in the evaluation of performance without regard to any production process. The 
benchmarking models we formulate are aimed at setting targets that result from projections of the 
DMUs onto the Pareto frontier of the attainable set AS. Specifically, the DMUs of a given group will 
all be projected onto the same facet F of the frontier of AS, because they experience similar 
circumstances. That is, they will be benchmarked against the same reference set of DMUs, which 
would be those that span that facet. Note in any case that some flexibility within the groups is 
permitted for target setting, because the DMUs in the groups can be projected onto different points 
of the facet of the frontier spanned by the common reference set (as in Cook and Zhu (2007) and 
Cook et al. (2017)). As said before, the choice of such facet/reference sets is made by minimizing 
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globally the differences between the payments of incentives relative to the DEA targets and those of 
the goals. Summing up, DEA targets for the DMUs in a given group Jg can be obtained as follows 
 
 DEA DEA DEAj j j 1j 1j 1j sj sj sjˆ ˆ ˆY Y S y y s ,..., y y s ,          r=1,…,s, gj J    (3) 
 
where  j 1j sj gS s ,...,s , j J ,    are the optimal solutions of the model 
 
   
 
g
g
s
rj rj rj rj
j J r 1 j r
j j j 1j 1j 1j rj rj rj g
rj
p s p s
Min
Q
s.t. :
ˆ ˆ ˆY Y S y y s ,..., y y s F j J
s free r, j
 


        


   (4) 
 
Here, F denotes a facet of the Pareto frontier of AS (see Bessent et al. (1988) and Olesen and 
Petersen (1996), which are two relevant papers dealing with facets in DEA). Model (4) must be solved 
G times, one for each group of DMUs Jg, g=1,…,G. 
 Note that in (4) the differences between the payments of incentives relative to the DEA targets 
and those of the goals are normalized by the amount of incentives corresponding to each index 
indicator initially available for each DMUj, in order to avoid a possible effect of size of the DMUs. 
 Solving (4) will provide us with the following information: 
 The targets to be used in the evaluation of performance of the DMUs. This is the key issue in the 
step of monitoring and control of the incentive plans, because they establish the potential in terms 
of which the degree of improvements of each unit is evaluated. The achievement of improvements 
is actually the ultimate end of the incentive plans. Regardless of the way the benchmarking is 
carried out, we eventually have actual performances and targets for each indicator. So, as in a 
conventional DEA benchmarking analysis, comparisons between these two quantities allow us to 
identify individual strengths and weaknesses, and define directions for further improvement. 
Moreover, comparisons between goal bundles and the bundles of DEA targets show how goals 
have been adjusted for the evaluation (if such adjustments actually occur). 
 The payment of incentives,  j jP S , for every DMUj, relative to targets that are attainable and 
represent best practices. Obviously, large differences between  j jP S  and jQ  indicate that there 
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is still room for improvement for DMUj. Specifically, low incentive rates    rj rj j rp s Q ,   
r=1,…,s, show individual areas for improvement. In practice, it may happen that  j jP S  and 
 gj jP S  (the incentives resulting from the evaluation relative to the goals) are similar; in fact, 
model (4) seeks to minimize the differences between both payments. This may serve as validation 
of the payments based on the goals, because in that case DMUj is given an amount of incentives 
that is very similar to that which would result from an appropriate target setting. However, it 
should be noted that, in spite of having similar payments, there might be differences between 
DEA targets and goals, which is important for the evaluation of the degree of improvements. 
 
Some results are needed in order to develop an operative formulation of (4) that gives rise to 
the targets that are wanted. However, before presenting the technical developments in the next 
subsection, we explain the idea behind the approach proposed through a small example. 
3.2. Numerical example 
Consider the DMUs in Table 1, which are evaluated in terms of two indicators. For each unit, 
this table records the goals set in period of time t-1, the initially available amount of incentives (we 
suppose that half of these incentives correspond to each indicator, that is, r 0.5,   r=1,2, in all 
cases) and the actual values of the indicators in period of time t. 
 
Table 1. Data numerical example 
 
 Table 2 displays the results provided by model (4). For each DMU, in the first row we have 
the actual data and the initially available amount of incentives; in the second row, the DEA targets 
and the payments corresponding to the evaluation made in terms of such targets; and in the third row, 
the goals set in t-1 and the amount of incentive corresponding to the evaluation relative to the goals. 
For the sake of simplicity, the setting of targets has been done separately for each unit, that is, no 
classification of the DMUs into groups has been considered. 
 
Table 2. Results numerical example 
 
 Figure 2 depicts the situation graphically for DMUs D, E and F. For DMU D, the goals set in 
t-1 (the point gD) are outside the AS corresponding to actual performances in time period t, so they 
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can be deemed as unattainable goals. We can see how model (4) adjusts the benchmarking to these 
goals so that the DEA targets are the coordinates of point D’, which lies on the best-practice frontier 
of AS. If D were evaluated with respect to the goals, it would achieve 9.17€ (of the 20€ initially 
available): we have a deviation from the goal of 1 unity in y1; since the actual y1 is 3, the room for 
improvement in this indicator is 33.3%, so it is paid 66.6% of the incentives, that is, 6.66€; following 
a similar reasoning, there is a room for improvement of 75% in y2, so it is paid 25% of the incentives, 
that is, 2.5€. Since the goals are unattainable, model (4) sets alternatively targets through D’, by 
minimizing the differences between the payments relative to the goals and those relative to the targets 
(by indicators). If D were evaluated with respect to the DEA targets, which are less demanding, then 
it would be paid 12.17€ (following a similar reasoning to that used with the goals), 3€ more than in 
the evaluation relative to the goals. The evaluation of D with respect to the DEA targets reveals 
therefore that there is still room for improvement in both indicators for that unit (by 33.3% for y1 and 
45% for y2).  
 For DMU E, the goals (point gE) are inside AS, so they can be deemed as unambitious goals. 
The DEA targets on the Pareto frontier of AS (the point E’) reveals that E should improve by 50% 
both in y1 and y2. In this case, the setting of targets results from a reduction in the payment of 
incentives of 4€, as DEA targets are more demanding than the goals. As for DMU F, its goals are on 
the Pareto frontier of AS, so DEA targets set by model (4) coincide with the goals. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 Figure 3 depicts the situation of the DEA efficient DMUs. For DMU A, the DEA targets are 
adjusted to the goals, which are outside AS, through point A’ on the Pareto frontier. Thus, in spite of 
being DEA efficient, when goals are considered, the evaluation shows that there is room for 
improvement for DMU A in y1 (by 100%), albeit the target has been outperformed in y2. In this case, 
the amount of incentives to be paid coincides with the payment relative to the goals, 12.5€ (no 
incentives correspond to the performance in y1 because the room for improvement is 100%, while 
for y2 the total available incentives are to be paid because the goal is achieved and the target is 
outperformed). Something similar occurs for DMU C. As for DMU B, whose goals are inside AS, 
DEA targets provided by model (4) coincide with actual performances, thus getting the total of 
available incentives. 
 
Figure 3 
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3.3. Technical developments 
In this subsection we develop an operative formulation of model (4) that allows us to find its 
optimal solution. In order to do so, we first reformulate (4) as follows 
 
   
 
g
g
g
s
rj rj rj rj
j J r 1 j r
kj rk rj rj g
k E
kj g
k E
k 0 k
r rj g
k k
kj k
j J
k k
kj g
p s p s
Min
Q
s.t. :
y y s j J r 1,...,s (5.1)
1 j J (5.2)
u Y u d 0 k E (5.3)
u y 1 j J r 1,...,s (5.4)
d M b k E (5.5)
M (1 b ) k E (5.6)
d 0,b 0,1 k E
0 k E j J
u
 





    
  
    
  
 
   
  
   




0 rj g,s   free j J r 1,...,s 
   (5) 
 
where E is the set of extreme efficient DMUs (in the Pareto sense) of AS, and M is a large positive 
quantity. 
 The constraints (5.1)-(5.2) guarantee that the projections j gYˆ , j J ,  belong to AS. With (5.3)-
(5.4) we allow for supporting hyperplanes that contain facets of the Pareto frontier of AS (note that 
their coefficients are restricted to be strictly positive). (5.5)-(5.6) are the key restrictions that link the 
two previous groups of constraints. By virtue of these, model (5) ensures targets on the Pareto frontier 
of AS. Note that, if 
g
kj
j J
0

   then kb 0  and, consequently, kd 0 . This means that if kDMU  in 
E participates actively as a referent in the benchmarking of some DMUj, gj J ,  then it necessarily 
belongs to 0u Y u 0.    That is, the kDMU 's E  that participate in the benchmarking of the DMUs 
of a given group Jg are all on a same facet of the Pareto frontier of AS, because these kDMU 's  belong 
all to a common supporting hyperplane of AS, 0u Y u 0,    whose coefficients are non-zero. 
Therefore, solving (5) allows us to identify a common reference set of efficient DMUs, 
 g j gRS DMU 0,  for some j J    , for the benchmarking of the DMUs in Jg, so that targets 
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result from their projections onto the facet of the Pareto frontier of AS, spanned by the DMUs in RSg.  
Specifically, these targets, which are actually the coordinates of the projections, can be found by using 
the optimal solutions of (5) as follows:  
g
* * * *
j j 1j 1j 1j sj sj sj
RS
ˆ ˆ ˆY Y y y s ,..., y y s , 

       gj J . 
 
Remark 2. Constraints (5.5)-(5.6) include the classical big M and binary variables. Nevertheless, (5) 
can be solved in practice by reformulating these constraints using Special Ordered Sets (SOS) (Beale 
and Tomlin, 1970), which avoid the need to specify M. SOS Type 1 is a set of variables where at 
most one variable may be nonzero. Therefore, if we remove (5.5)-(5.6) from the formulation and 
define instead a SOS Type 1, for each pair of variables  k k,d ,  k E , where 
g
k kj
j J
,

    then it is 
ensured that 
g
kj
j J
  and kd  cannot be simultaneously positive for DMUk’s, k E.  CPLEX Optimizer 
(and also LINGO) can solve LP problems with SOS. SOS variables have already been used for 
solving models like (5) in Ruiz and Sirvent (2016), Aparicio et al. (2017) and Cook et al. (2017). 
 
 The following proposition provides a linear expression of the payment of incentives  rj rjp s  
as defined in (2) 
 
Proposition 1. For every DMUj, j=1,…n, and each indicator yr, r=1,…,s, the following statement 
holds 
 
  rj1 2rj rj j r rj j r rj rj
rj
s
p s Q I Q 1 I , s R
y
 
       
 
       (6) 
 
where 
3 1 2 3
rj rj 1 rj rj rj rj 2 rjy I M I s y I M I    , 
1
rjI ,  
2
rjI  and 
3
rjI  being binary variables such that 
1 2 3
rj rj rjI I I 1,    and M1 and M2 are two big positive quantities. 
 
Proof. Suppose that  rj rjp s  is defined as in (2). Let rjs 0 . Then, according to Proposition 1, this 
can only happen if 
2 3
rj rjI I 0   and 
1
rjI 1 . In that case, (6) leads to  rj rj j rp s Q ,   like in (2). 
Likewise, if rjs 0 , we have either 
1
rjI 1  and 
2 3
rj rjI I 0   or 
2
rjI 1  and 
1 3
rj rjI I 0.   In both cases (6) 
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yields  rj rj j rp s Q ,   like in (2). If rj rj0 s y  , then 2rjI 1  and 1 3rj rjI I 0,   so 
  rjrj rj j r
rj
s
p s Q 1
y
 
    
 
, like in (2). If rj rjs y , then either 
2
rjI 1  and 
1 3
rj rjI I 0   or 
3
rjI 1  and 
1 2
rj rjI I 0,   so  rj rjp s 0 , like in (2).  And finally, if rj rjs y , then 3rjI 1  and 1 2rj rjI I 0,   so 
 rj rjp s 0 , like in (2).          ■ 
 
 As a result of Proposition 1, model (5) can be reformulated as follows, wherein we have 
removed the absolute values in the objective function by applying the change of variables normally 
used to that end 
 
 
   
g
s
rj rj
j J r 1 j r
rj1 2 g
j r rj j r rj rj rj rj rj g
rj
3 1 2 3
rj rj 1 rj rj rj rj 2 rj g
1 2 3
rj rj rj g
p p
Min
Q
s.t. :
constraints (5.1)-(5.4)
s
Q I Q 1 I p p p s j J r 1,...,s (7.1)
y
y I M I s y I M I j J r 1,...,s (7.2)
I I I 1 j J r 1,..
 
 
 


 
          
 
     
    

 
 
g
k kj
j J
rj rj g
k kj g
k k
1 2 3
rj rj rj g
0 rj g
.,s (7.3)
k E (7.4)
p ,p 0 j J r 1,...,s
d 0, 0 k E j J
,d SOS1 k E
I , I , I 0,1 j J r 1,...,s
u ,s   free j J r 1,...,s

 
   
  
    
 
  
 

  (7) 
 
 The following proposition allows us to find lower bounds for M1 and M2 
 
Proposition 2. For every DMUj, gj J , and each indicator yr, r=1,…,s, the following statement holds  
 
 rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

    
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Proof. From (5.1), we have rj rj kj rk
k E
y s y 0

    . Then, rj rjs y  . On the other hand, 
 rj rj rj kj rk rk
k E
k E
s y s y max y


     , because of (5.2).     ■ 
 
Corollary 1. It suffices to set M1 at rjy  in the constraint (7.2) corresponding to indicator yr of DMUj 
and M2 at  rk
k E
max y

 in the constraints involving indicator yr. 
       
 Model (7) is still a non-linear problem because of the products of continuous and binary 
variables 
2
rj rjs I , gj J , r 1,...,s.  Using the change of variables 
2
rj rj rjz s I , gj J , r 1,...,s,  an 
equivalent mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP) is formulated in the next proposition, 
wherein we have also considered the lower bounds for M1 and M2 which were found in corollary 1. 
 
Proposition 3. Model (7) is equivalent to the following MILP problem 
 
 
   
 
 
g
s
rj rj
j J r 1 j r
rj1 2 g
j r rj j r rj j r rj rj rj rj g
rj
2 2
rj rj rj rj rk g
k E
2 2
rj rj rj rj rj rk
k E
p p
Min
Q
s.t. :
constraints (5.1)-(5.4)
z
Q I Q I Q p p p s j J r 1,...,s (8.1)
y
y I z I max y j J r 1,...,s (8.2)
y (1 I ) s z (1 I ) max y
 
 
 




         
    
     

 
 
 
g
g
3 1 2 3
rj rj rj rj rj rj rj rk g
k E
1 2 3
rj rj rj g
k kj
j J
rj rj g
k kj g
k k
1 2 3
rj rj rj
j J r 1,...,s (8.3)
y (I I ) s y I I max y j J r 1,...,s (8.4)
I I I 1 j J r 1,...,s (8.5)
k E (8.6)
p ,p 0 j J r 1,...,s
d 0, 0 k E j J
,d SOS1 k E
I , I , I 0,1


 
 
     
    
   
  
    
 


g
0 rj rj g
j J r 1,...,s
u ,s ,z   free j J r 1,...,s
 
 
  (8) 
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Proof. It suffices to prove that (7) and (8) have the same constraints in the different scenarios resulting 
from the specification of the binary variables. 
Suppose that 
1
rjI 1  for some r and some j. Then, the corresponding constraints for these r and 
j in (7.1) and (7.2) become    gj r rj rj rj rjQ p p p s      and rj rjy s 0   , respectively, while in (8.1)-
(8.4) those constraints would be, respectively,    gj r rj rj rj rjQ p p p s     , rjz 0 ,
 rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

    and rj rjy s 0   . That is, both sets of constraints coincide. 
If 
2
rjI 1,  then in (7) we have    
rj g
j r j r rj rj rj rj
rj
s
Q Q p p p s
y
        and rj rj0 s y  , whereas 
in (8) (8.3) implies rj rjs z , so (8.1) becomes    
rj g
j r j r rj rj rj rj
rj
s
Q Q p p p s
y
       , (8.2) is 
 rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

    and (8.4) is rj rj0 s y  . 
Finally, if 
3
rjI 1,  (7.1) and (7.2) become  grj rj rj rjp p p s    and  rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

  , 
respectively, while in (8) (8.1)-(8.4) are, respectively,  grj rj rj rjp p P s   , rjz 0 , 
 rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

    and  rj rj rk
k E
y s max y

  .      ■ 
 
 Eventually, we can obtain the optimal solutions of model (4) by solving problem (8). Note 
that (8) is a mixed integer linear problem (MILP) in which the number of binary variables and SOS 
variables depends on the number of indicators considered and that of efficient DMUs. In the DEA 
applications that we usually find in practice (8) becomes a problem that can be easily solved by using 
conventional software.  
4. Illustrative example 
For purposes of illustration only, in this section we apply the proposed approach in an example 
concerning the financing of public Spanish universities. 
The public Spanish universities may be seen as a set of homogeneous DMUs that undertake 
similar activities and produce comparable results in respect of their missions (teaching, research,…), 
so that they can be compared in terms of a common set of outputs which can be defined for the 
analysis (see Dyson et al. (2001) for a discussion on homogeneity assumptions about the units under 
assessment). Public Spanish universities are not specialized either in teaching or research. They all 
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come under the same set of general regulations. Nevertheless, in Spain, many of the competences 
related to education are transferred to the regional (autonomous) governments. This means that the 
management in these Higher Education Institutions (HEI) is determined to some extent by the policies 
established by these local governments. These include the offer of study programs, the fixing of 
university fees, the policy for the promotion of research, the setting of goal levels for quality 
indicators of teaching and research, the financing models and even the regulation of supplements for 
staff salaries.  
Concerning the financing of universities, the models used in the different regions are 
distinguished mainly by their components of base financing and other issues of a more strategic 
nature. Base financing includes government grants and own resources of the universities, like tuition 
fees and research incomes, and is aimed at covering ordinary running costs, delivery of educational 
services and investments. However, universities can often have access to extra financing by means 
of the implementation of pay-for-performance incentive plans, which are typically linked to the 
achievement of goals. Thus, policy makers and university managers of HEI, through this strategic 
component of financing, seek to offer ways that may help universities to achieve the desired aims of 
efficiency, effectiveness and quality. 
Incentive plans at public Spanish universities typically pay for performance in areas like 
teaching or research, which is evaluated in terms of some index indicators. Payment is made on the 
basis of the degree of achievement of goals. As for the setting of goal levels for each university, these 
often result from an agreement (a programme-contract) between the corresponding regional 
government and their own managers of that university, in which stakeholders take into consideration 
their objectives and policies, the knowledge of prior period performance, etc…  
This situation of HEI in Spain, where, as said before, many of the competences in education 
are transferred to the regional governments, suggests that the universities of a given region are 
experiencing similar circumstances for the development of the activities in the context of their 
different missions. Therefore, it would be desirable to treat them uniformly in the benchmarking 
analysis that is carried out for the setting of targets. For this reason, we use the approach proposed in 
this paper by considering as groups the universities in each of the regions, so that targets result from 
their benchmarking against a common reference set (region-specific) of efficient universities, as a 
consequence of not allowing for individual circumstances within the autonomous regions. Note, 
however, that this DEA-based approach allows for regional circumstances, which would be justified 
by the possible variations in their goals and policies. 
 The analysis carried out here is concerned with the overall performance of the universities in 
the sense that indicators related to the two main areas of activity, teaching and research, are 
 17 
considered. In order to do so, we have selected both indicators such as rates of progress, graduation 
and retention, and others related to publications (production and quality) and research income. 
Specifically, the following indicators have been considered for the analysis: 
 
- PROGRESS RATE: Ratio of the number of passed credits2 corresponding to all the students 
enrolled in 2013-14, to the total enrolled credits in that academic year (as a percentage). 
- GRADUATION RATE: Percentage of students that completed the programme of studies in 2013-
14, in relation to number of students enrolled for the first time in 2010-11. 
- RETENTION RATE: This is computed as 100 minus the drop out rate, in order to be treated as 
an output, i.e., a “the more the better” variable. The drop out rate is the percentage of students 
that abandon in 2013-14 the subject in which they enrolled for the first time in 2011-12. 
- ARTICLES: Ratio of the total number of articles published in the period 2009-13, to the academic 
staff in the academic year 2013-14 (with full-time equivalence). 
- %Q1: Percentage of articles published in journals classified in the 1st quartile of the corresponding 
category. 
- RESEARCH INCOME: Ratio of total income from research projects (grants) in competitive calls 
and contracts with companies and administrations in 2013 to academic staff in the academic year 
2013-14 (with full-time equivalence). 
 
Data for these variables have been taken from the reports by the Conference of Rectors of the 
Spanish Universities (CRUE), and by the Foundation FCyD3. Table 3 records the universities 
considered in the analysis, classified by regions (the selection of the sample has been determined by 
the availability of data4). 
 
Table 3. Universities by regions 
 
The DEA analysis of the entire sample reveals 9 efficient universities: UAB, UBA, UDL, 
UPF, URI, UVA, UAM, UMH and UPVA. The universities in each of the regions are benchmarked 
against reference sets associated with some of the facets of the Pareto frontier formed by these 9 
universities. We report the results corresponding to the benchmarking analyses of three regions as 
representative cases: Cataluña, Andalucía and Comunidad Valenciana. These are recorded in Tables 
                                                 
2 Credit is the unit of measurement of the academic load of the subject of a programme. 
3 It could be translated as Foundation for the Knowledge and Development. 
4 The rate of graduation for UVEG has been estimated. 
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4, 5 and 6, respectively, together with actual data. Each of these three tables contains information 
regarding both the DEA benchmarking and the incentive plans. We suppose that, in the academic 
year 2012-13, goals were set for each university as specified in the rows “goal” of these tables. The 
last column of the tables records the initially available amount of money for each university, in the 
incentive plan (in the first row corresponding to each university). This information has also been 
taken from the CRUE report and represents approximately 10% of the current transfers coming from 
the regional governments in 2013. We also report the money that the universities receive, on the basis 
of the evaluation of their performance relative to the DEA targets and the goals, and the payment 
rates (expressed in terms of percentages of the available amount). As for the benchmarking, the tables 
record, for each university, its actual data and the DEA targets corresponding to each indicator (as 
obtained from model (8)), aside from the goals. 
 
Table 4. DEA target setting and goals (Cataluña) 
Table 5. DEA target setting and goals (Andalucía) 
Table 6. DEA target setting and goals (Comunidad Valenciana) 
 
Looking at the payment rates allows us to identify universities which still have room for 
improvement after the implementation of the incentive plans. In this respect, it should be pointed out 
that the payments resulting from the DEA targets are very similar to those relative to the goals in all 
of the universities. This would validate the payments relative to the goals initially established, because 
the amounts of money given to the universities are practically the same as those that would be derived 
from an evaluation of performance relative to targets which are attainable and efficient. Nevertheless, 
DEA targets and goals differ for some indicators in some universities. DEA targets are sometimes 
higher and sometimes lower than the goals. Only in the case of the RETENTION rate, are DEA 
targets always more demanding. We note, in addition, that goals (the goal bundles) for UAB, UPC, 
UPF and UPVA, represent plans of performance that are not achievable, because they do not belong 
to the attainable set AS. For example, in the case of UPC, the target set by the model is lower than 
the goal for ARTICLES, while at the same time that of INCOMES has been set at a more demanding 
level (in addition to making some small adjustments in other indicators), in order to set an attainable 
bundle of DEA targets for the evaluation of this university. For all these reasons, we carry out the 
benchmarking by using the DEA targets. 
Tables show a better performance in the case of universities of Cataluña. On average, the 
universities in Cataluña have a payment rate relative to DEA targets of 90.28%, while in Andalucía 
this rate is of 80.78%, even though the levels of the targets set in that region are lower. In Cataluña, 
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whose universities are benchmarked against UPF, UVA, UAM, UMH and UPVA, we highlight the 
case of UPF, whose payment rate is of 98.4%. This means that this university gets practically the 
entire amount of money available in the incentive plan. Its actual performance exceeds that arising 
from the DEA targets in almost all the indicators, except in the RETENTION rate wherein this 
university should improve. In contrast, UPC shows a poorer performance (its payment rate is 75.7%). 
DEA targets reveal that this university performs well in terms of the numbers of ARTICLES 
published, but it should improve significantly the quality of its publications (%Q1); in INCOMES it 
has achieved the objective. As for teaching performance, UPC has an important weakness in the 
GRADUATION of students (the actual rate, 13.21%, is far below the target of 36.88%), while some 
small improvements are also needed in the other rates. 
In Andalucía, where the reference set is formed by UPF, URI, UVA, UAM, UMH and UPVA, 
UAL and UGR are the universities that have performed better, albeit they have some important 
weaknesses: UAL in INCOMES and UGR in the rate of GRADUATION. In contrast, UCA and 
UMA, whose payment rates are 70.5% and 73.6%, respectively, still have much room for 
improvement both in teaching and research activities. Finally, in Comunidad Valenciana, UPVA and 
UMH have been the best performers, while UA and UJI should improve the production of ARTICLES 
and INCOMES aside from the rate of GRADUATION. 
5. Conclusions 
The DEA literature dealing with the evaluation of performance in presence of management 
goals is scarce. This paper makes a contribution in this area through an approach that provides a 
benchmarking framework based on appropriate targets for the monitoring of improvements of DMUs 
that follow the implementation of pay-for-performance incentive plans. In this context, the goals that 
have been set may sometimes be unachievable or, on the contrary, may not be ambitious enough 
(sometimes because of participative goal setting). We show how DEA can be extended through a 
process of benchmarking adjusted to the goals that allows us to set targets that are attainable and 
represent best practices. The setting of targets also takes into account the policy of improvements that 
is pursued through the implementation of incentive plans, because we seek targets that respect, as 
much as possible, the payments of incentives relative to the goals set.  
The proposed methodology should be of special interest in areas where pay-for-performance 
plans are usually implemented, like Health Care. In this area, DEA has already been used to create a 
composite measure of quality within the framework of a pay-for-performance program (see Shwartz 
et al., 2016). Our approach would provide an alternative for performance evaluation through the 
 20 
setting of targets that represent best practice performances. Higher Education is another potential area 
of application of the methodology, as has been illustrated here with an example in which we evaluate 
performance of public Spanish universities in the context of their financing. Nigsch and Schenker-
Wicki (2015) raise the need to use efficiency analysis for incentive-setting and the reallocation of 
funds, in a discussion on the use of DEA for analyzing the performance of universities.  
Regarding future directions, a couple of lines of research can be envisaged. On one hand, we 
should develop a dynamic DEA framework, where targets and goals are adjusted with incentives and 
penalties over a several time periods. On the other, new DEA benchmarking models for performance 
evaluation should be formulated within a more general framework, wherein management goals are 
set, but without having a monetary incentive for their achievement (in line with those proposed in 
Stewart (2010)). 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
This research has been supported through Grant MTM2016-76530-R (AEI/FEDER, UE).  
 21 
References 
Anderson, S.W., Dekker, H.C. and Sedatole, K.L. (2010) An Empirical Examination of Goals and 
Performance-to-Goal Following the Introduction of an Incentive Bonus Plan with 
Participative Goal Setting, Management Science, 56(1), 90-109. 
Aparicio, J., Cordero, J.M. and Pastor, J.T. (2017) The determination of the least distance to the 
strongly efficient frontier in Data Envelopment Analysis oriented models: Modelling and 
computational aspects, Omega, 71, 1-10. 
Banker, R.D., Lee, S.Y. and Potter, G. (1996) A field study of the impact of a performance-based 
incentive plan,  Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21, 195-226. 
Banker, R.D., Potter, G. and Srinivasan, D. (2000) An empirical investigation of an incentive plan 
that includes nonfinancial performance measures, Accounting Review, 75(1), 65-92. 
Beale, E.M.L. and Tomlin, J.A. (1970) Special facilities in a general mathematical programming 
system for non-convex problems using ordered sets of variables, in J. Lawrence (ed.), 
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Operational Research (Tavistock 
Publications, London, 1970), 447-454. 
Bessent, A., Bessent, W., Elam, J. and Clark, T. (1988) Efficiency frontier determination by 
constrained facet analysis, Operations Research, 36(5), 785-796. 
Charnes, A., Cooper, W.W. and Rhodes, E. (1978) Measuring the efficiency of decision making units, 
European Journal of Operational Research, 2(6), 429-444. 
Cook, W.D. and Zhu, J. (2007) Within-group common weights in DEA: An analysis of power plant 
efficiency, European Journal of Operational Research, 178(1), 207-216. 
Cook, W.D., Ruiz, J.L., Sirvent, I. and Zhu, J. (2017)  Within-group common benchmarking using 
DEA, European Journal of Operational Research, 256, 901-910. 
Cook, W.D., Tone, K. and Zhu, J. (2014) Data envelopment analysis: Prior to choosing a model, 
Omega, 44, 1-4. 
Cooper, W.W. (2005) Origins, Uses of, and Relations Between Goal Programming and Data 
Envelopment Analysis, Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 13, 3-11. 
Dyson, R.G., Allen, R., Camanho, A.S., Podinovski, V.V., Sarrico, C.S. and Shale, E.A. (2001) 
Pitfalls and protocols in DEA, European Journal of Operational Research, 132(2), 245-259. 
Liu, W.B., Zhang, D.Q., Meng, W., Li, X.X. and Xu, F. (2011) A study of DEA models without 
explicit inputs, Omega, 39(5), 472-480. 
Nigsch, S. and Schenker-Wicki, A. (2015) Frontier Efficiency Analysis in Higher Education, in I.M. 
Welpe et al. (eds.), Incentives and Performance, Springer. 
Olesen, O. and Petersen, N.C. (1996) Indicators of ill-conditioned data sets and model 
 22 
misspecification in Data Envelopment Analysis: An extended facet approach, Management 
Science, 42, 205-219. 
Ruiz, J.L. and Sirvent, I. (2016) Common benchmarking and ranking of units with DEA, Omega, 65, 
1-9. 
Shwartz, M., Burgess Jr., J.F. and Zhu, J. (2016)  A DEA based composite measure of quality and its 
associated data uncertainty interval for health care provider profiling and pay-for-
performance, European Journal of Operational Research, 253, 489-502. 
Stewart, T.J. (2010) Goal directed benchmarking for organizational efficiency, Omega, 38, 534-539. 
Thanassoulis, E., Portela, M.C.A.S. and Despic, O. (2008) Data Envelopment Analysis: the 
mathematical programming approach to efficiency analysis, in: The measurement of 
productive efficiency and productivity growth, Oxford University Press. 
Yang, J.B., Wong, B.Y.H., Xu, D.L. and Stewart, T.J. (2009) Integrating DEA-oriented performance 
assessment and target setting using interactive MOLP methods, European Journal of 
Operational Research, 195, 205-222. 
  
23 
 
 
 
Table 1. Data of numerical example 
 Period t-1  Period t 
DMU goal y1 goal y2 Total Incentives  y1 y2 
A 3 7 25  1 7 
B 5 4 30  6 5 
C 8 4 20  9 1 
D 4 7 20  3 4 
E 6 3 25  5 2 
F 2 6.6 20  2 5 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of numerical example 
 Data Payments of incentives 
DMU  y1 y2  y1 y2 Total 
A Actual 1 7 Available 12.5 12.5 25 
 Targets 2 6.6 Targets 0 12.5 12.5 
 Goals 3 7 Goals 0 12.5 12.5 
B Actual 6 5 Available 15 15 30 
 Targets 6 5 Targets 15 15 30 
 Goals 5 4 Goals 15 15 30 
C Actual 9 1 Available 10 10 20 
 Targets 8.25 2 Targets 10 0 10 
 Goals 8 4 Goals 10 0 10 
D Actual 3 4 Available 10 10 20 
 Targets 4 5.8 Targets 6.67 5.5 12.17 
 Goals 4 7 Goals 6.67 2.5 9.17 
E Actual 5 2 Available 12.5 12.5 25 
 Targets 7.5 3 Targets 6.25 6.25 12.5 
 Goals 6 3 Goals 10 6.25 16.25 
F Actual 2 5 Available 10 10 20 
 Targets 2 6.6 Targets 10 6.8 16.8 
 Goals 2 6.6 Goals 10 6.8 16.8 
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Table 3. Universities by regions 
ANDALUCÍA  CANARIAS 
U. de ALMERÍA (UAL)  U. de LA LAGUNA (ULL) 
U. de CÁDIZ (UCA)  U. de LAS PALMAS de G. C. (ULPGC) 
U. de GRANADA (UGR)   
U. de JAÉN (UJA)  ARAGÓN 
U. de MÁLAGA (UMA)  U. de ZARAGOZA (UZA) 
U. de SEVILLA (USE)   
  ASTURIAS 
CATALUÑA  U. de OVIEDO (UOV) 
U. AUTÓNOMA de BARCELONA (UAB)   
U. de BARCELONA (UBA)  CANTABRIA 
U. de GIRONA (UDG)  U. de CANTABRIA (UCN) 
U. de LLEIDA (UDL)   
U. POLITÉCNICA DE CATALUÑA (UPC)  CASTILLA LA MANCHA 
U. POMPEU FABRA (UPF)  U. de CASTILLA-LA MANCHA (UCLM) 
U. ROVIRA I VIRGILI (URV)   
  EXTREMADURA 
CASTILLA Y LEÓN  U. de EXTREMADURA (UEX) 
U. de BURGOS (UBU)   
U. de LEÓN (ULE)  ISLAS BALEARES 
U. de VALLADOLID (UVA)  U. de las ISLAS BALEARES (UIB) 
   
COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA  MURCIA 
U. de ALICANTE (UA)  U. de MURCIA (UMU) 
U. JAUME I de CASTELLÓN (UJCS)  U. POLITÉCNICA DE CARTAGENA (UPCT) 
U. MIGUEL HERNÁNDEZ de ELCHE (UMH)   
U. POLITÉCNICA DE VALENCIA (UPVA)  NAVARRA 
U. de VALENCIA (ESTUDI GENERAL) (UVEG)  U. PÚBLICA DE NAVARRA (UPN) 
   
MADRID  PAIS VASCO 
U. de ALCALÁ de HENARES (UAH)  U. del PAÍS VASCO (UPV) 
U. AUTÓNOMA de MADRID (UAM)   
  LA RIOJA 
GALICIA  U. de LA RIOJA (URI) 
U. de LA CORUÑA (ULC)   
U. de VIGO (UVI)   
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Table 4. DEA target setting and goals (Cataluña) 
  ARTICLES %Q1 INCOMES PROGRESS GRADUATION RETENTION Payments 
UAB actual 7.14 59.48 14256.16 84.39 36.08 81.95 15,000,000.00 
 target 5.65 59.90 15000 85 40 85.45 14,455,127.27 (96.4%) 
  goal* 6 60 15000 85 40 85 14,464,537.02 (96.4%) 
UBA actual 5.59 62.29 8383.88 83.98 29.79 81.55 20,000,000.00 
 target 4.06 53.03 10000 82.69 40 88.30 17,938,771.89 (89.7%) 
  goal 5 60 10000 85 40 85 18,033,392.57 (90.2%) 
UDG actual 4.15 52.27 11815.68 83.55 29.39 77.24 5,000,000.00 
 target 4.15 52.14 11815.68 82.74 40 87.86 4,584,635.52 (91.7%) 
  goal 4 50 10000 85 40 85 4,601,029.47 (92.0%) 
UDL actual 3.20 58.10 6492.60 81.91 43.03 85.40 4,000,000.00 
 target 4 52.66 10000 82.62 38.94 88.41 3,442,643.38 (86.1%) 
  goal 4 60 10000 85 40 85 3,424,922.83 (85.6%) 
UPC actual 6.68 39.45 17847.51 76.05 13.21 78.94 13,000,000.00 
 target 4.55 50 17847.51 83.42 36.88 86.32 9,841,404.20 (75.7%) 
  goal* 6 50 15000 85 40 85 9,832,693.22 (75.6%) 
UPF actual 8.12 59.8 35555.19 89.95 51.66 77.95 5,000,000.00 
 target 5.69 60 15702.07 86.58 40.49 85 4,921,862.56 (98.4%) 
  goal* 6 60 25000 85 40 85 4,921,862.56 (98.4%) 
URV actual 4.76 57.83 12250.08 83.14 41.21 80.88 6,000,000.00 
 target 5.00 55.61 15000 84.83 39.06 86.13 5,639,714.23 (94.0%) 
  goal 5 60 15000 85 40 85 5,614,153.06 (93.6%) 
* Goals for this university represent a plan which is outside AS 
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Table 5. DEA target setting and goals (Andalucía) 
  ARTICLES %Q1 INCOMES PROGRESS GRADUATION RETENTION Payments 
UAL actual 3.68 44.50 11903.49 77.70 35.08 80.44 6,000,000.00 
 target 4 50 15000 80.43 32.18 87.81 5,402,694.12 (90.0%) 
  goal 4 50 15000 80 35 85 5,443,169.03 (90.7%) 
UCA actual 1.83 48.23 8961.71 77.64 17.95 80.89 11,000,000.00 
 target 3 50 6170.32 79.24 35 90.60 7,759,069.88 (70.5%) 
  goal 3 50 10000 80 35 85 7,655,603.61 (69.6%) 
UGR actual 4.05 52.37 15241.30 77.24 22.29 80.98 17,000,000.00 
 target 4.05 55 8587.71 80.17 35 89.00 14,853,727.62 (87.4%) 
  goal 4 55 15000 80 35 85 14,999,711.36 (88.2%) 
UJA actual 3.33 48.12 9157.57 77.11 22.94 78.84 7,000,000.00 
 target 4 51.76 10000 78.53 35 89.20 5,782,554.31 (82.6%) 
  goal 4 50 10000 80 35 85 5,865,140.54 (83.8%) 
UMA actual 2.67 44.18 9622.92 75.05 27.80 82.33 11,000,000.00 
 target 4 49.46 15000 81.20 35 87.67 8,095,434.16 (73.6%) 
  goal 4 50 15000 80 35 85 8,161,669.27 (74.2%) 
USE actual 3.02 52.71 13723.68 72.24 22.24 82.49 18,000,000.00 
 target 4 47.96 15000 80.11 35 87.99 14,497,122.07 (80.5%) 
  goal 4 55 15000 80 35 85 14,480,276.99 (80.4%) 
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Table 6. DEA target setting and goals (Comunidad Valenciana) 
  ARTICLES %Q1 INCOMES PROGRESS GRADUATION RETENTION Payments 
UA actual 2.76 48.39 6868.54 81.02 30.38 89.92 12,000,000.00 
 target 4 52.60 10000 82.52 40 88.38 9,346,396.51 (77.9%) 
  goal 4 50 10000 85 40 85 9,392,607.97 (78.3%) 
UJI actual 2.97 48.88 7810.98 77.91 28.42 80.70 7,000,000.00 
 target 4 52.60 10000 82.52 40 88.38 5,526,258.16 (78.9%) 
  goal 4 50 10000 85 40 85 5,600,097.60 (80.0%) 
UMH actual 4.36 54.34 8703.58 74.56 31.51 89.86 6,000,000.00 
 target 4.24 54.34 10000 83.21 39.80 88.05 5,471,761.85 (91.2%) 
  goal 4 50 10000 85 40 85 5,441,556.96 (90.7%) 
UPVA actual 4.97 44.96 27320.81 83.72 33.82 84.18 21,000,000.00 
 target 5 50 21387.06 83.96 40 85.02 19,901,068.16 (94.8%) 
  goal* 5 50 25000 85 40 85 19,858,344.15 (94.6%) 
UVEG actual 3.02 52.71 13723.68 72.24 22.24 82.49 24,000,000.00 
 target 5 55.56 15000 84.74 40 86.11 21,368,626.46 (89.0%) 
  goal 5 50 15000 85 40 85 21,357,035.96 (89.0%) 
* Goals for this university represent a plan which is outside AS 
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Figure 2. Target setting for DMUs D, E and F 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Target setting for DMUs A, B and C 
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